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A SYLLABUS OF ERRORS
Douglas Laycock*

By Marci A. Hamilton. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 414. $28.
GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW.

INTRODUCTION

Modem American society is pervasively regulated. It is also religiously
diverse to a degree that is probably unprecedented in the history of the
world. It is inevitable that some of these diverse religious practices will violate some of these pervasive regulations, and equally inevitable that if we
ask whether all these regulations are really necessary, sometimes the answer
will be no.
If we take free exercise of religion seriously, sometimes it will make
sense to exempt sincere religious practices from generally applicable lawsbut only some laws, and only some applications. Hardly anyone thinks that
human sacrifice should be exempted from the murder laws. And hardly anyone thinks that government should compel Catholics to ordain female
priests, or forbid children to take a sip of communion wine. Other cases
provoke more disagreement. Who should decide, and on what criteria?
The legal claim in God vs. the Gavel is that only legislatures may decide, and that judges may not. The legislature must enact specific rules for
religious exemptions; it may not enact religious exemptions under a generally applicable standard to be interpreted by judges. Professor Marci
Hamilton' briefly argues for this claim in Chapter Ten.
The rest of the book is a poorly executed rant--disorganized, selfcontradictory, and riddled with errors. Chapters One through Nine make a
much broader legal claim that is quietly abandoned in Chapter Ten. Chapter
Ten suggests that her position may not be as extreme as it often sounds, but
this appearance of moderation is too little, too late, to save a dreadful book.
Elsewhere I have praised Hamilton's judgment,2 but this time there is nothing good to say.
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AN OVERVIEW

Part One catalogs abuses and alleged abuses by religious organizations
and individuals. Chapter One asserts that Americans hold an unrealistic belief that religion is always good. But in fact, Hamilton says, religion does
much harm, and therefore must be regulated. Chapters Two through Seven
give examples: children (physical and sexual abuse, withholding medical
care); marriage (principally polygamy); churches in residential neighborhoods, which sometimes cause parking, traffic, or other problems;
miscellaneous issues in public schools, prisons, and the military; and discrimination in church employment and by religious landlords.
Chapter Three has a long digression on same-sex marriage, which appears to be simply an occasion to bash conservative believers. The ban on
same-sex marriage is unrelated to exemptions or to regulating churches;
Hamilton's feeble effort to link the issues is to say that religious entities
want their own way on both marriage and exemptions (pp. 55-56). She is
notably more sympathetic to court decisions protecting gays than to court
decisions protecting the exercise of religion (pp. 62-65), but she never explains why courts are more competent to override legislative judgments in
one of these doctrinal areas than the other.
Part Two addresses history and doctrine. Chapter Eight is a tendentious
account of the Supreme Court's decisions on regulatory exemptions for religious conduct. Chapter Nine is the historical version of Part One, equating
modem claims to exemptions with abuses by established churches from the
twelfth century forward. Chapter Ten finally argues for the claim that only
legislatures may grant exemptions.
The abuses catalogued in Part One have little relevance to her ultimate
legal claim. Of course some religious behavior must be regulated, but that
tells us very little about whether judges, legislators, or both should decide
when to regulate and when to exempt. To the extent that Part One is relevant, it cuts against her argument for legislative exclusivity, because her
most troubling examples are exemptions granted by legislatures, not judges.
She complains that legislators serve religious lobbyists and ignore the public
interest. So why does she insist that these irresponsible legislators should be
the only persons trusted with questions of exemption?
She has no plausible answer to that question. But her criticism of legislators does make sense of the chapters on religious abuses. These chapters
are aimed at voters and legislators. "The purpose of this book is to persuade
Americans to take off the rose-colored glasses and to come to terms with the
necessity of making religious individuals and institutions accountable to the
law so that they do not harm others" (p. 3). Only legislators can exempt religious practices from regulation, but when they consider legislation that
affects religion, legislators should be highly suspicious of churches.
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AND DISAPPEARING THESES

A. No-Harm
Hamilton's ultimate claim in Chapter Ten is very different from her initial claim in Chapter One. Chapter One argues that religious organizations
should be subject to all the regulations that restrict other organizations"unless they can prove that exempting them will cause no harm to others"
(p. 5). She repeatedly elaborates on what she calls "the no-harm principle"
(pp.5,7-8, 11,205-10,227,260-63, 275,288).
The no-harm principle sounds plausible on first reading, but it cannot
withstand analysis. Of course religious believers have no constitutional right
to inflict significant harm on nonconsenting others. But we live in a crowded
society, where routine activities both inconvenience those around us and
impose significant risks. Every first-year law student has to confront the fact
that if we want to eliminate wrongful deaths, we must do without cars and
bridges. We also have an expansive capacity to define as harmful anything
we don't like. A rule that no religious group could do anything the political
process defined as harmful would leave all religions at the mercy of any
interest group that could persuade some regulatory body to act.
But Hamilton refuses to draw any distinctions, insisting that "a harm is a
harm is a harm" (p. 206)-a reductionism she uses four times (with minor
variations) (pp. 11, 116, 206, 212). One of her examples is a neighborhood
that objects to a synagogue taking over a monastery on a ten-acre parcel
with ample off-street parking. But "[t]raffic studies indicated that the synagogue's proposed use would increase the number of cars daily from fewer
than 10 to over 100," thus causing "a seismic change that would affect basic
aspects of the homeowners' lifestyles" (p. 101). A hundred cars a day is one
car every ten minutes during sixteen waking hours, or more likely, occasional clusters of cars between long intervals in which the traffic flow is
basically unaffected. If this be "seismic," it is hard to imagine what could
count as "no harm." Hamilton would effectively permit the residential owners to define as harmful any productive use of the ten acres and the existing
building, because any productive use would generate additional traffic. The
right to worship cannot exist without a space to worship in, and if any increase in traffic counts as harm, the no-harm rule would make it impossible
to create new places of worship.
This example appears in a land use chapter that is entirely devoted to
residential neighborhoods. She never discloses that many church zoning
disputes involve commercial properties.' Churches seeking to locate in
commercial neighborhoods face different claims of harm: that they won't
generate enough traffic, or that they won't generate tax revenue.4 Loss of tax
revenue is a universally applicable harm that would justify eliminating every
3.

Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755,

760-62, 777-78 (1999).
4.

Id. at 762, 774-75.
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place of worship anywhere in the country, until and unless legislatures begin
taxing churches. If worship could be excluded on any ground a neighbor, a
zoning board, or a taxing authority characterized as harm, the right to worship would be subject to the standardless discretion of local officials.
Despite its surface plausibility, a literal no-harm standard is untenable.
So Hamilton abandons her no-harm standard. She briefly suggests that
"de minimis harm to the public" is acceptable (pp. 275, 280). Then she
moves to a third standard:
The legislator's task is one of balancing the value of religious liberty over
and against the harm to others if a religious individual or institution is
permitted to act contrary to the law.... [T]he legislature should weigh, on
the one hand, the importance of respect and tolerance for a wide panoply
of religious faiths, and on the other hand, whether the harm that the law
was intended to prevent can be tolerated in a just society. (p. 297)
The no-harm and de minimis standards disappear without a mention. She
never acknowledges that her position has changed, but it has changed fundamentally. Churches and religious individuals may harm their neighbors
after all if the harm "can be tolerated" and if prohibiting the harmful religious activity would inflict a greater harm to religious liberty. Preventing
intolerable harm to others is a compelling interest that justifies regulation of
religion on even the most protective theory of free exercise. The disagreement is over how to strike the balance. Hamilton would place a much lower
value on religious liberty and a much higher value on every passing car. But
she and I can apparently agree that the essence of the problem is to balance
competing harms.
Sometimes she strikes the balance more sensibly. She approves the exemption from military service and the exemptions for religious use of
peyote, for communion wine during Prohibition, for "neat and conservative"
religious apparel in the military, and for religious discrimination in hiring
clergy (pp. 280-83). She seems to approve the exemption that allows some
faiths to maintain an exclusively male clergy (p. 190). Some passages in
Chapter Ten actually sound quite reasonable. But she can appear reasonable
only because she has abandoned her no-harm principle.
B. InstitutionalCompetence
There remains her claim about institutional competence: for purposes of
striking the balance between religious liberty and the risk of harm to others,
"the only legitimate branch is the legislature" (p. 297). She admires neutral
and generally applicable laws but not neutral and generally applicable standards for exemptions. She vigorously condemns the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act 5 (RLUIPA) and the state and federal Religious

5.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
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Freedom Restoration Acts6 (RFRAs) (pp. 9-11, 175-77, 288, 299-302). The
implication is that the legislature must strike the balance itself and enact
specific rules for every category of conflict between religious practice and
secular law.
Her faith in legislatures is incomprehensible, because she has little good
to say about them. Legislators have exempted harmful religious behavior
that no judge would ever exempt under a generally applicable standardmost notably, parents refusing to provide medical care for their children.
According to Hamilton, legislatures in thirty-two states have enacted "a defense for felonious child neglect, manslaughter, or murder, where the child's
life was sacrificed for religious reasons" (p. 32). She appears to have missed
some, 7 but she exaggerates nonetheless. As her footnote implicitly confesses
(pp. 321-22 n.84), these exemptions generally apply only to neglect laws,
not to homicide. Even so, this is a remarkable body of legislation. Preserving the life and health of children is clearly a compelling interest, because a
child may suffer irreparable harm before it is old enough to decide for itself.
Not even Hamilton suggests that any court has had trouble with that issue.
But she says that legislatures have repeatedly gotten it wrong-even after
highly publicized tragedies (pp. 38, 300-01).
Her treatment of licensing religious child-care centers is similar. She approves six court decisions upholding licensing requirements, with no cases
going the other way, and she complains bitterly of twelve statutes that exempt religious facilities in whole or in part (pp. 45, 327 nn.148-150). She is
very skeptical of home schooling, but nearly all exceptions for home schooling were won in legislatures or by political pressure on state education
agencies, and not in courts.8 She is outraged by Sikh children carrying
ceremonial knives to school, but she reports that the California legislature
voted an exemption for Sikh knives (p. 117). "[C]ommon sense prevailed"
when the governor vetoed the bill (p. 117).
She complains of legislative process: "Too often, the determination is
made in the back halls" (p. 300), or by riders in unrelated bills (p. 9). She
complains of bills passed without hearings (p. 302), and of hearings where
opponents are not allowed to testify (p. 87). Legislators are "constitutionally
ill-informed" (p. 301), "confused" by lobbyists (p. 301), "predisposed to
follow the requests of religious organizations" (p. 301), often "muddleheaded about religion" (p. 165), and often "captured by special interests and
incapable of acting in the public's interest" (p. 298). Legislators are more
responsive to cohesive minorities than to the broad public (pp. 285-86).
6. The federal RFRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000). Citations to
state RFRAs are collected in Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 155, 211 nn.368-369 (2004).
7.
James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and
Education Laws as Denialsof Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV.
1321, 1354 (1996) (reporting forty-six states).
8.
60 GEo.

Neal Devins, Fundamentalist Christian Educators v. State: An Inevitable Compromise,
L. REV. 818, 819 (1992).
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They "often pass laws that are nonsensical, unnecessary, and just plain political" (p. 279) and "ill-conceived" (p. 280). Yet these are the only people
she trusts to decide when to exempt religious practice from regulation.
She invokes the Founders' view that "every institution holding power
was likely to abuse that power" (p. 276), and the nation's experience with
early state legislatures that did indeed abuse their unchecked powers (p.
276). Yet she proposes that legislative decisions to regulate without religious
exemptions should never be subject to judicial review. This is largely unchecked power; judicial review, and not the veto, is the check designed to
protect minority groups.
She would overcome these problems largely by wishing it so. She announces "three necessary conditions for legitimate" religious exemptions:
"Exempting religious conduct from neutral, general laws must be (1) duly
enacted by a legislature, not decreed by a court; (2) must be debated under
the harsh glare of public scrutiny; and (3) must be consistent with the larger
public good."9

Her discussion of her public-scrutiny requirement consists entirely of
examples where legislatures allegedly acted without publicity (pp. 300-02).
She offers not a word about how to make legislators generate publicity for
discussions they prefer to have in private. Nor does she explain how legislators could ensure public scrutiny if they tried. Legislators compete fiercely
for public attention, and they have limited capacity to influence what the
media choose to cover.
Nor does she suggest a way to enforce her requirement that legislative
exemptions be consistent with the public good. It cannot be that judges will
review that question. She emphasizes that courts are "incompetent" (not just
"somewhat less qualified") to decide questions about the public good
(p. 297). This public-good requirement may just be an odd way of restating
her insistence that statutes granting exemptions enact narrow rules rather
than broad standards.10
Her principal argument for legislative supremacy is a romantic faith in
the investigative power of legislatures. Legislators "have at their disposal the
power to subpoena witnesses, to hold extensive hearings, to commission
studies, and to elicit the views of any expert" (p. 297). In contrast, judges
are confined to the issues raised by the parties (p. 296). "Ajudge is required
to be open-minded, to be evenhanded, and to read the law as the legislator
intended" (p. 296). She appears to think that these requirements are defects!
By contrast, legislators can "reject the facts and theories presented to them"
(p. 297).
This view of legislative hearings is divorced from reality. Legislators can
do serious investigations, but they rarely do. The typical Congressional hearing consists of witnesses reading prepared five-minute statements in panels
of three or four. Many committee members do not attend and those who do
9.

P. 275. These conditions are elaborated at pp. 295-302.

10. Compare pp. 9-10 (defining "blind exemptions" as exemptions that are broad rather than
specific), with p. 300 (defining "blind exemptions" as exemptions not based on the public good).
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often wander in and out. Each member gets to make an opening statement
and to ask five minutes of questions to each panel, that is, one to two minutes of questions and answers per witness. Most members read questions
prepared by staff, and hardly any member is prepared to ask probing followup questions.
Legislators are not stupid, but they are spread far too thin. They face
constant fundraising, constituent service, importuning by lobbyists, political
posturing and spin control, and thousands of bills in every session on every
conceivable topic. They cannot possibly become expert on more than a few
of those bills. Yet Hamilton would have them separately investigate every
conflict between any religious practice and any law, enacting specific solutions to every one. Congress already explained, in the committee reports on
RFRA, that "[i]t is not feasible to combat the burdens of generally applicable laws on religion by relying upon the political process for the enactment
of separate religious exemptions in every Federal, State, and local statute."'
The party in the minority often gets fewer than half the witnesses and
only one week's notice of the hearing. No interest group is guaranteed the
right to testify. But anyone with enough time or money can lobby. Most of
the real discussions in which legislators "find" facts occur ex parte and off
the record. The laws they enact are legitimate because they are responsible
to voters and because this is apparently the best we can do, not because anything about legislative investigations inspires confidence.
All of this assumes that legislators are free to investigate the public good
and to vote their consciences. Sometimes they are. But often they are locked
into positions by ideology or political pressure before the hearing ever begins. Then the hearing is a charade.
Despite these problems, broad policy questions are better left to legislators than to courts, and it is common to explain this preference by praising
the legislature's ability to find facts. It would be more accurate to say that
with respect to broad, multi-polar questions about how complex economic
and social systems will respond to proposed changes in policy, no one finds
facts very well because the facts are simply too complicated. But such questions are particularly ill-suited to the judicial process, which is designed for
two-sided disputes that can be focused on one or a few specific questions.
And the national experience with judges deciding economic questions as a
matter of constitutional law was not good. In the legislative process, many
of the competing interests with a stake in such questions are represented,
and all are free to lobby. So we leave those questions to legislatures, even
though a vast literature suggests that much economic regulation is ineffective or counterproductive.
Judicial decision-making is also highly imperfect. But when a question
of fact can be stated with some specificity in an adversarial format, I have
no doubt that judicial fact finding is more reliable than legislative fact finding. A claim to religious exemption addresses a specific religious practice,
11.
H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993); for a somewhat similar statement, see S. REP. No.
103-111, at 8 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897.
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to be performed under specific circumstances, recognizing that any exemption will extend to all similar practices and circumstances that cannot be
honestly distinguished. The question whether such an exemption will do any
harm, and how much, is reasonably focused and well suited to adversary
presentations.
Each side is guaranteed a fair and equal opportunity to present its evidence and arguments. Litigants may invoke the judicial process as of right;
unlike legislators, judges cannot simply ignore questions presented to them.
Because each side has an advocate to marshal its case, it is far more likely
that a judge will hear the most important evidence than that a Congressional
committee will. Witnesses can be effectively cross-examined, which is rare
in legislative hearings. Judges are overworked just as legislators are, but in
an important case presenting a serious constitutional question, judges can
usually commit substantial blocks of time. Judges do not wander on and off
the bench while hearings continue in their absence. All judicial proceedings
are on the record, and ex parte contacts are forbidden. When a judge makes
up her mind because a campaign contributor talks to her before the hearing
begins, it is corruption; when a legislator does the same thing, it is business
as usual.
Hamilton fears that religious advocates will select test cases with unusually attractive facts, or that the first government litigant may not present its
best case (p. 296), and that all other governments will then be bound
(p. 298). But subsequent litigants can distinguish the unrepresentative first
case on the basis of more and different evidence, and even in the rare event
where the first case goes to the Supreme Court, cases can be distinguished
or overruled. Statutes can be amended without regard to precedent, but with
serious problems of congested calendars and legislative inertia, it is not at
all clear that mistaken precedents are harder to change than mistaken statutes. It is clear that judicial precedents under statutes such as RFRA and
RLUIPA can be changed by ordinary legislation, with the same ease or difficulty as the possible legislative corrections on which Hamilton relies (p.
298).
Hamilton emphasizes relative competence at fact finding; Justice
Scalia's more traditional objection was that courts should not balance competing interests after the facts were found. 2 But here the judiciary's
obligation to state reasons and do equal justice to all is a real advantage over
the legislature's openness to lobbyists and political pressure. As I said in an
earlier discussion of these issues, "the reality of the legislative process is
totally unsuited to principled decisions about whether one faction's desire to
suppress an annoying religious practice is really the least restrictive means
of serving a compelling government interest."' 3 That sentence would be
equally true under any standard of review greater than absolute deference to
the strongest interest group.
12.

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,889-90 & n.5 (1990).

13. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. 73 TEx. L. REv. 209. 221 (1994).
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Hamilton finds it "inconceivable" that the Supreme Court would create a
constitutional exception to the drug laws for religious use of peyote (p. 220).
And she condemns the courts for interpreting RFRA to create an exception
for religious use of hoasca,'4 a drug that is similar to peyote in its chemistry
and religious use, "without hearings or studies" (p. 309). (A two-week preliminary injunction hearing after ten months to prepare" 5-far more attention
than Congress could devote to such a narrow issue-apparently does not
count as a hearing.) But she praises the legislative exception for religious
use of peyote (pp. 226, 280-81), apparently unaware that Congress took
nearly all its findings about peyote from Justice Blackmun's dissent in Employment Division v. Smith.' 6 Congress had limited capacity to investigate,
but the facts had been developed to its satisfaction in a judicial proceeding.
I do not claim that over the long run judges will do a better job than legislators of protecting religious minorities. I do claim that the judicial process
is better at finding facts in cases that are judicially manageable. And Hamilton's examples show that judges are less likely to grant foolish exemptions
that result in serious harm. Judges sometimes are willing to protect unpopular minorities, but legislators hardly ever; legislators
7 cannot afford to protect
any group that is seriously unpopular with voters.
The legislative and judicial processes have different strengths and weaknesses, and the principal benefit of judicial review is that it gives
constitutional claims a chance to be heard in each forum. Part of the genius
of separation of powers is that suppression of liberty requires at least the
acquiescence of all three branches. The legislature must enact the bill and
refuse an exemption; the executive must sign the bill and enforce the law
even against religious practices; and the courts must uphold the law as applied to religious practices. Hamilton's assertions about the inherent
superiority of legislatures do nothing to justify removing the final link in
that chain of protections.
III.

ERRORS AND FALSEHOODS

Hamilton's tale of harms inflicted by churches is anecdotal, which is the
way to reach an intended audience of voters and legislators. There is no dispute over the larger point: churches and religious believers have done things
that should be regulated. But her specific claims are so error ridden that one
cannot believe anything she says without confirming it. Some of these errors
are simply sloppy, but many flow from her exaggerated rhetorical style. She

14.
(2006).

See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211

15. See 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente [sic] Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F Supp. 2d
1236, 1240 (D.N.M. 2002).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 103-675, at 7-8 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404,
2409-10.
17. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 775-77 (1998) (showing that legislators are least likely to
help those religious minorities who are treated the worst).
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characterizes every example in the worst possible terms, and she does not
allow mere facts to get in the way of good rhetoric.
A. Sexual Abuse
Hamilton leads with graphic stories of sexual abuse of children and adolescents. One might suppose that here, if anywhere, she could work with the
horrific facts she has, without exaggeration or misrepresentation. But one
would be wrong.
She tries to create the impression that the issue is a claim of a First
Amendment right to sex with minors. Thus she says that "religious entities"
"have attempted to use the First Amendment as a shield in prosecutions involving child rape and murder" (p. 10). Perhaps she could defend this
statement as technically true in a dispute over a prosecutor's subpoena for
confidential documents. But it is not true in any sense in which it is likely to
be read by her intended audience of voters and legislators. No one claims a
First Amendment right to rape or molest. The "murder" cases turn out to be
prosecutions of parents for withholding medical care, in which religious
entities are not defendants, the charge is rarely murder, and the defense under a specific statutory exemption is far more plausible than any defense
under the First Amendment. A leading example is Walker v. Superior
Court,8 in which a Christian Scientist mother was prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment, and the court devoted thirteen
pages to the statutory defenses but less than two to the First Amendment.
She says that "[t]he criminal clergy and the religious institutions that
knew about the pedophiles in their midst routinely invoke both the First
Amendment and religious liberty legislation to avoid liability for the harm"
(p. 18). As to the "criminal clergy," this statement is false. Their religious
liberty argument would have to be that religious liberty provisions protect
sexual crimes. Their lawyers do not "routinely" make such a foolish argument, and if some have made it on occasion, no court has taken it seriously.
The religious institutions do argue that they should not be liable, and
some of their arguments are based in religious liberty, but these arguments
have nothing to do with a right to molest children. This litigation is about
issues of church governance and theories for imposing liability on the employers of molesters and on parishes who never employed a molester but
were in the same diocese with one. Reasonable people can disagree about
those issues, but Hamilton's readers never learn what the issues are.
No one has a right to sexually abuse children. But when the question is
whether people who did not sexually abuse children should be held responsible for the torts of those who did, the issues get harder-for religious and
secular institutions alike. No employer is vicariously liable for every employee who molests a child, even at the work site. Sexual contact with a
child so obviously serves only the personal interests of the molester that

18.

763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988).
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courts have held it not within the course and scope of employment.'9 An
employer is liable in such cases only for its own torts in negligently hiring,
training, retaining, or failing to supervise an employee after learning of the
20
employee's propensity to sexual misconduct.
Now we come to the first serious religious liberty question: government
does not get to tell churches who can preach or administer the sacraments
and who cannot, or how those who do should be selected and trained. Religious liberty could hardly exist if appointment of clergy were controlled by
the government. But lawsuits alleging that it was wrongful to let Father
Jones work in a parish, or wrongful to ordain him in the first place, give
judges and juries the effective power to review the appointment of clergy.
Some plaintiffs have filed much broader claims, alleging that the whole system of selecting and training clergy, and even the allocation of authority
within the church, should have been structured differently.2 These claims
would put the system for selecting all future clergy in the control of juries.
Narrow versions of some of these claims may be justified. There may
well be a compelling interest in requiring churches to remove known child
molesters from positions where they have continuing access to children, or
even in requiring some financially responsible entity to accept legal responsibility for the safety of children. But to explain the religious liberty interest
on one side, and the arguments for overriding that interest on the other side,
would complicate the simple narrative of evil churches hiding behind the
First Amendment.
Hamilton describes only one court decision that addresses such questions, and she grossly misrepresents the decision. She says that in Gibson v.
Brewer,22 the plaintiffs "cited nine neutral principles of law that would have
been invoked and applied to the defendants were they a teacher who fondled
a child and a school that knowingly placed children in the reach of a pedophile" (p. 27). But "the Missouri Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment immunized the defendants from the law" (p. 27). "Thus, a pedophile and a religious institution covering for him were relieved of any
civil liability for their actions on the basis of supposed First Amendment
principles" (p. 27).
The claim that the court relieved "a pedophile" of liability is simply
false. The claims against the accused priest were still pending in the trial

19.

See Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV.

1089, 1113-14 (2003).

20.

See id. at 1114-19.

21. See Patrick J. Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious
Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 947, 960-69 (2003) (reviewing claims that would exclude from the priesthood men with any history of almost any imaginable kind of emotional problem); Petition for Writ
of Mandamus and Brief in Support 20-24, United States Catholic Conference, Inc. v. Ashby (Tex.
No. 95-0250) at 20-23 (summarizing claims alleging that Conference of Bishops should have issued
different "guidelines for priestly selection, formation, and education," id. at 21 (quoting Petition of
John Doe IV, Count VII, 3), and should have "petition[ed] the Pope for the authority to implement
policy," id. at 23 (quoting argument of plaintiffs' counsel, Transcript of Hearing, Jan. 5, 1995 at 74)).
22.

952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997).
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court." He had neither been found guilty nor "relieved of liability." If he
were guilty, no argument made by the diocese would have protected him.
Nor were there nine "neutral principles of law" that would have been
applied to a school but not the diocese. There were nine theories in plaintiffs' somewhat scattershot complaint. On four of those theories (breach of
fiduciary duty, conspiracy, respondeat superior, intentional infliction of
emotional distress), the court held, on state-law grounds having nothing to
do with religious liberty, that plaintiffs failed to state a claim. 4 These claims
would have been equally barred on the same allegations against a secular
employer. Four claims were barred by religious liberty considerations (negligent hiring/ordination/retention of clergy, negligent failure to supervise
clergy, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and independent negligence of the diocese 25) on plausible grounds that Hamilton does not explain.
26
A final claim was not barred. Plaintiffs were allowed to proceed on
their claim that the priest's supervisors "knew that harm was certain or substantially certain to result from [their] failure to supervise. 2 7 This claim
required only that responsible church officials knew of the priest's propensities and the consequences that would result, and that they did nothing. If the
diocese knew anything like as much as what Hamilton repeatedly alleges
about churches in this chapter, liability would follow under this standard.
Her comparison of the church in this case to "a school that knowingly placed
children in the reach of a pedophile" (p. 27; emphasis added) is thus deeply
misleading; the church was held responsible for anything it actually knew.
She claims that the court dismissed all nine counts, and that all nine were
dismissed on grounds uniquely available to churches; each of these claims is
false.
Nor is it true that if the abuser were a teacher and the employer were a
school, defendants would have greater liability. If the employer were a public school, it would have sovereign immunity from state-law claims.
Missouri has waived sovereign immunity for negligence only for the operation of motor vehicles, 21 for dangerous conditions in government-owned
property, 29 and for proprietary functions.30 A Missouri school district and its
administrators have been held immune where plaintiffs alleged that a driver
repeatedly beat and sexually abused handicapped children on his bus and
that the school failed to investigate complaints."

23.

Id. at 244-45.

24.

Id. at 245-46, 249.

25.

See id. at 246-50.

26.

Id. at 248.

27.

Id.

28.

Mo. REV. STAT.

29.

Id.

30.

See State ex rel. Allen v. Barker, 581 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Mo. 1979).
Doe v. Special Sch. Dist., 637 F. Supp. 1138, 1141-42, 1146-49 (E.D. Mo. 1986).

31.

§ 537.600 (2000).
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School districts have federal liability under Title IX,3" but only if an official with authority "to institute corrective measures" has "actual knowledge"
of the abuse and makes "an official decision ... not to remedy the violation."33 This standard is not greatly different from the standard the Missouri
courts applied to churches.
Both the religious liberty protections for churches and the immunity of
school districts vary from state to state. The point is not that no state protects churches more than public schools (I haven't investigated both bodies
of law in all fifty states) or that any particular jurisdiction gets the balance
just right. The point is that Hamilton's description of Gibson v. Brewer is
false in multiple and obvious ways, and that these misrepresentations serve
her larger claim that churches get special treatment because no one imagines
they would do anything wrong.
B. Employment Discrimination
Religious institutions have two kinds of exemptions from the federal
employment discrimination laws (and most similar state laws). First, by express statutory exception in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a religious
organization (section 70214) or a religious school (section 70331) may prefer
employees "of a particular religion." These exceptions permit religious discrimination; they do not permit any other kind of discrimination. They apply
to any employee of the religious organization or school, even if his duties
are not "'even tangentially related to any conceivable religious belief or
ritual.' ,,36 These exceptions permit a religious organization to maintain a
critical mass of its own believers in the workforce that executes its mission.
Second, by judicial interpretation, religious organizations may hire and
fire their clergy and similar religious leaders on any criteria they choose;
courts will not entertain lawsuits alleging discrimination of any kind.37 This
rule is commonly known as "the ministerial exception. 38 Hamilton emphasizes that this rule permits religious qualifications that would be illegal in a
secular context, such as the requirement that Catholic priests and Orthodox
rabbis be male (p. 190). But that purpose would be served by a much narrower exception. The primary purpose is to prevent judges and juries from
second-guessing the church's "choice as to who will perform particular
spiritual functions."39 If a pastor is dismissed for reasons of race or sex, that
32.

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).

33.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).

34.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000).

35.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2000).

36. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 332 (1987) (quoting district court).
37. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F3d 294, 303-04 & nn.5-7 (3d Cir. 2006) (collecting
cases).
38. Id. at 299.
39.

See id. at 304.
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is unfortunate, but it would be worse if a judge erroneously found discrimination where the pastor had really been dismissed because his performance
was unsatisfactory, or if the judge imposed an unwanted spiritual leader on a
church-no matter why that leader had lost the confidence of his flock. Reasonable people could disagree about the balance of costs and benefits, but
Hamilton never admits that there are competing interests to balance.
The two kinds of exception are fundamentally distinct. The section 702
and section 703 exceptions are narrow (religious discrimination only) with
broad application (any employee of a religious organization or school). The
ministerial exception is broad (any kind of discrimination) with narrow application (only the clergy). Hamilton cannot keep them straight. She cannot
even keep straight what an exception is: she cites contractual promises not
to discriminate as an "exception" to the discrimination laws (p. 189). Of
course that is backwards; an enforceable contract can impose liability where
statutes would not.4°
With respect to the real exceptions, she says that the section 702 exception raises issues of whether the employee "works in a religious or secular
capacity" and whether "the employment action was based on a religious
belief' (p. 189). The first of these issues is plainly irrelevant under the clear
text of section 702, which was amended to eliminate any restriction to employees doing "religious" work.4 ' The second is more subtly misstated. The
employment action must be based on the employee's religion; usually it will
also be based on a religious belief of the employer, but that fact is legally
irrelevant. She cites eleven cases for the relevance of these two issues
(p. 357 nn.38-39). Nearly all are ministerial exception cases, and thus irrelevant to her point about section 702. A few of these cases mentioned
section 702 in passing, en route to a holding based on the ministerial exception or some broader claim of constitutional immunity. Of the one case
unambiguously based on section 702, she says that the Court "interpreted
the idea of 'religious employee' broadly" to include a janitor, citing Corporation of the PresidingBishop v. Amos. 4' But the Court did no such thing. It
was common ground in the Supreme Court that section 702 applies to janitors, 3 and the Court upheld that broad exception against the claim that it
established religion. And although Hamilton puts "religious employee" in
quotation marks and implies that this is a statutory phrase to be "interpreted," no such phrase appears in the statute.
Her discussion of the ministerial exception is equally garbled. She can't
decide whether to use extreme examples to show that the ministerial excep40.

See, e.g., id. at 310 (refusing to dismiss contract claim).

41.
Compare Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, 78 Stat. 253, 255 (permitting church to prefer
believers for work in "its religious activities"), with Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
§ 3, 86 Stat. 103, 103-04 (deleting "religious").
42. P. 357 n.38; Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
43. The district court rejected the argument that § 702 could be construed to apply only to
"employment involving religious activities," 483 U.S at 332 n.8, and the Court did not review that
issue. See also id. n.9 (noting strong support in legislative history for district court's interpretation).
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tion is a terrible rule, or to push her theory of how it could be reinterpreted
to a much narrower scope that she would find less objectionable. Spinning
in both directions at the same time, she can't keep her story straight.
First she says that the exception applies "where the discriminationis religiously motivated' (p. 189; emphasis added). But the alleged discrimination
need not have been religiously motivated, as some of her own examples show
(pp. 191-92, 195). Then she says there is a "broad reading" that gives "carte
blanche" to discriminate, and a "narrower" reading that makes churches liable
where their employment decision "is unrelated to the religious belief' (p.
192).
Then she says there is "incremental" movement toward holding
churches liable "in most circumstances" (p. 196). Two pages later, this "incremental" movement has become "a marked trend" (p. 198). This "trend"
consists of sexual harassment cases; she cites no successful claim by a minister not subjected to sexual harassment. She could argue that this narrow
exception for sexual harassment cases should unravel the whole principle
and lead to her preferred rule that the alleged discrimination must be motivated by religious doctrine. But she cannot make that argument, because she
is never candid about the limited nature of the cases that support her claim.
Again she miscites the cases. Her initial example of a ministerial exception case is in fact a section 703 case; the plaintiff was not a minister but a
. Ass n45 for the
school librarian. 44 She cites EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing
whose
duties 'go to the
proposition that "sec. 702 applies only to employees
46
the minwas
discussing
fact,
the
court
heart of the church's function;' , in
48
47
holding
that a
College
as
Mississippi
EEOC
v.
isterial exception. She cites
the
358
n.51);
exception
(p.
section
702
claim
the
college
cannot
religious
49
but
exception
section
702
claim
the
college
can
held
that
the
actually
case
cannot claim the ministerial exception "[b]ecause the College is not a
church and its faculty members are not ministers. 50 These are well known
cases in the field, but she appears not to understand them.
C. The Law of Free Exercise (and Some Miscellany)
Word limits preclude even a listing of many other errors, exaggerations,
and misleading innuendos. I can give only a few more examples.

44.
1992).
45.

Pp. 189, 358 n.41; Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 804 (N.D. Cal.
676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).

P. 358 n.50 (citing Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1278).
47. See Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1278 (discussing what it calls "the McClure exception").
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), was the original leading case announcing
the ministerial exception.
46.

48.

626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).

49.

Id. at 484-85.

50.

Id. at 485.
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She claims that the Free Exercise Clause requires strict scrutiny only
where the claimant proves governmental "'hostility' or 'animus' toward
religion" (p. 216). Her attempt to read this theory into the Court's cases
ranges from misleading to false. Her account (pp. 214-15) of Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,5 which struck down a ban on

animal sacrifice, is merely misleading. That case could have been decided
on grounds of animus, but when Justice Kennedy tried to decide it that way,
he got only two votes.52
She claims that "the Court found animus" (p. 215) in McDaniel v. Paty,53
which invalidated a Tennessee provision excluding clergy from the legislature. This is simply false; the Court found that when the provision was
adopted in 1796, it was thought necessary to protect the disestablishment of
religion. 54 Only Justice Brennan's concurrence-which is not the opinion
she cites 5-- even mentions hostility, and it is clear that he is not making a
finding of actual hostility but simply inferring hostility from the face of the
law.5 6 Hamilton cannot infer hostility from facial discrimination alone, because she rejects that inference in Locke v. Davey."
She claims that Davey, which upheld Washington's refusal to fund
scholarships for theology students, "went on to explain, repeatedly," that
free exercise claims require "'hostility' or 'animus' toward religion"
(pp. 215-16). This remarkable sentence has no citation or supporting quotations. The Court does say there was no bad motive in Davey,5 and that the
state was just trying to enforce its view of the Establishment Clause.5 9
(Hamilton calls this motive "animus" in McDaniel v. Paty; she apparently
thinks it is not animus in Davey.) But Davey's facts control the scope of
Davey's holding: Davey is a funding case. The holding in Davey is that the
"mere failure to fund" religious education imposes no substantial burden on
the exercise of religion. Close textual analysis of the opinion confirms this
understanding and clarifies the references to motive: even a failure to fund
can become constitutionally suspect if the failure to fund is motivated by
religious hostility.6° If Professor Hamilton has an argument to the contrary,
she does not offer it.

51.

508 U.S. 520 (1993).

52.

See id. at 540-42 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).

53.

435 U.S. 618 (1978).

54.

See id. at 622-25.

55. P. 362 n.44; she cites the plurality opinion, 435 U.S. at 628-29, pages that reject Tennessee's claim of compelling interest and say nothing about motive.
56.

See id. at 636 (Brennan, J., concurring).

57.

540 U.S. 712 (2004).

58.

Id. at 721, 724-25.

59.

Id. at 721-25.

60.

See Laycock, supra note 6, at 213-18 (providing a close textual analysis).
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Discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder,6' the case exempting Amish children
from secondary education, she says that "every other citizen is required to
complete 12th grade," and "the last four compulsory years" (p. 131). In fact,
it was essential to the Court's reasoning that the state required children to
attend school only to their sixteenth birthday, so that the dispute was not
over four years of school but over one to two years.62
Twice she says that in Reynolds v. United States,63 the first of the Mormon polygamy cases, the Court said that "religious belief is absolutely
protected." 64 But judicial talk of absolute protection for belief is a twentiethcentury development.65 Reynolds said nothing about absolute protection, and
the Court was not ready to provide
S66it; the Court soon upheld punishment of
membership, teaching, and belief. She also has the federal antipolygamy
law governing "the Northwest Territory" (p. 211), which no longer existed;
of course the target was the Utah Territory.
She says that the enactment of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) shows "the political clout of organized
religions" (p. 94). But what the legislative process leading to RLUIPA
showed was that religious organizations could not pass a bill on their own in
the face of any significant opposition. As even Hamilton eventually recognizes, RFRA and RLUIPA passed with the support of a broad coalition that
included secular civil liberties organizations and the Department of Justice
(pp. 97, 178-80). When that coalition broke down in disagreement over the
proposed Religious Liberty Protection Act, Congress deadlocked and the
bill died (p. 184).
She says that I was "the architect" of RFRA (p. 288) and that RFRA was
drafted "following [my] advice" (p. 225). In fact, I was little known in
Washington at the time and had almost no role in the drafting. I was not
asked to testify at the first hearing; I wrote a post-hearing letter to the committee chair.67
She quotes the French law that prohibits wearing in public schools any
clothing or symbols that "conspicuously manifest a religious [or political]

61.

406 U.S. 205 (1972).

62.

See id. at 207, 222, 224.

63.

98 U.S. 145 (1879).

64.

P. 207. For a similar statement in different words, see p. 67.

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
66. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 49 (1890) (upholding penalties on church because it "perseveres, in defiance of law, in preaching,
upholding, promoting and defending" polygamy); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 334, 347 (1890)
(upholding test oath that denied the right to vote to any "member" of any organization that "teaches"
any person "to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy" or that "practices" "celestial marriage as
a doctrinal rite," or to any person who does not "regard" the secular laws as supreme, "the teachings
of any order, organization or association to the contrary notwithstanding").
65.

67. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 72 (1991) (letter to Chairman Don
Edwards from Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin).

1186

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 105:1169

affiliation" (pp. 128-29). But her bracketed insertion misrepresents the
French text, which says nothing about political (politique) symbols. 68 Then
she says this law would be constitutional in the United States because it is
"neutral and generally applicable" (p. 129). This claim implies a fundamental misunderstanding of the U.S. rule. The French law applies to all
religions, but the relevant point for U.S. law would be that it applies only to
religions.6 A French school girl can wear a head scarf to make a fashion
statement but not to make a religious statement. If Hamilton means to claim
that the statute bars religious symbols, and that a much older regulation
(which apparently had not been enforced) can be read as banning all conspicuous symbols, ° and that that combination is generally applicable-an
argument she never actually makes-she is still wrong. That prohibition
would also be unconstitutional in the United States
under Tinker v. Des
7
Moines Independent Community School District. 1

She says that "[r]ace-based housing discrimination was given a judicial
imprimatur in 1948, and was not declared unconstitutional for nearly two
decades" (p. 285; citation omitted). This has little to do with her topic, but it
misrepresents famous cases. The Court invalidated state-mandated housing
segregation in 1917.72 Her 1948 case is Shelley v. Kraemer,73 which invali-

dated judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants; she gets the
holding backwards. She misses the point of both Shelley and her 1967 case,
Reitman v. Mulkey;74 the issue in both cases was not discrimination, but state
action.
I could go on-and these are just the claims that were immediately suspicious on first reading. I have to infer that if I investigated each of her
footnotes, I would find many more such errors.
Occasional errors are inevitable, but here the extraordinary number of
errors, often with reference to famous cases and basic doctrines, implies a
reckless disregard for truth. I document these errors for a reason. No one
should cite this book. No one should rely on it for any purpose. You might
68. Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de La R6publique Franqais
[J.O.][Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190, available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=MENX0400001L (last visited Jan. 23, 2007) ("Dans les 6coles, les
coll~ges et les lycres publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les 61ves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit."). Roughly translated, the law provides that "[i]n
the public schools, colleges, and high schools, the wearing of signs or behaviors by which the pupils
conspicuously manifest a religious affiliation is prohibited." This quotation was translated with the
help of my French-speaking student, David Sack.
69. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 n.14 (1992) ("[A] law specifically directed at religious practice [does not] acquire immunity by prohibiting all religions.").
70.
See ROBERT O'BRIEN, THE STAsI REPORT: THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF REFLECTION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SECULARITY IN THE REPUBLIC 1-5 (2005)

(reprinting French and English versions of the regulation). If this regulation had been enforced, the
more recent law would not have been thought necessary.
71.

393 U.S. 503 (1969).

72.

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).

73.

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

74.

387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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use its footnotes as leads to other sources, but take nothing from this book
without independent verification.
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal scholars may be advocates, and they may reach out to nonscholarly audiences, but every scholar has a minimum obligation of factual
accuracy and intellectual honesty. God vs. the Gavel does not come close to
meeting either standard. Nor does it offer a sustained argument for its legal
claim about the institutional competence of courts and legislatures. Its many
footnotes offer the patina of scholarship, but there is no substance of scholarship. This book is unworthy of the Cambridge University Press and the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
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